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515 
21ST CENTURY ARMS CONTROL CHALLENGES: 
DRONES, CYBER WEAPONS, KILLER ROBOTS, 
AND WMDS 
MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL 
Dean David Wippman’s remarks at the 2013 Midwest Meeting of the 
International Law Association focused on how we in international law 
struggle with the view that international law is not really law—or not 
really law when it comes to the use of military force. Students of legal 
theory will tell you, however, that defining law poses challenges in all 
areas of law. Understanding what counts as law is no simple task. Still, the 
question of whether international law is really law may be more important, 
especially when it comes to the use of force, because the stakes are so 
high. Indeed, the stakes are probably higher than with respect to any other 
body of rules. 
Compare, for example, the city of Chicago where the law against 
murder is frequently violated. In 2012, 500 people were murdered in 
Chicago;
1
 few of the perpetrators will ever be identified, let alone 
prosecuted. When the rules on the use of force are violated, it is not 
hundreds that will die but hundreds of thousands. We typically know who 
is ultimately responsible for the resort to unlawful war and the resulting 
loss of life and destruction, but rarely are such persons prosecuted. In both 
contexts—domestic law against murder and international law against 
war—we must do better. I choose to work in the area of law against war 
and accept the challenge of persuading others as to why the law of the 
United Nations Charter binds the United States and all states, and why it 
matters that the United States and all states comply with this law. The task 
is challenging for a number of reasons, including the apparent decline in 
general knowledge respecting international law in the United States and 
the popularity of resort to military force. During 2013, however, we could 
see several indications that Americans were thinking differently about war. 
“War fatigue” has become a common phrase. The poor results and 
unintended consequences of major wars involving the United States 
 
 
  Robert and Marion Short Professor of Law and Research Professor of International Dispute 
Resolution, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame; with thanks for 
excellent research assistance to Sean Parish (JD expected 2015). 
 1. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIM. JUST. INFO. SERVICES 
DIVISION, Crime in the United States: Illinois, FBI.GOV, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-
in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/tables/8tabledatadecpdf/table-8-state-cuts/table_8_offenses_ 
known_to_law_enforcement_by_illinois_by_city_2012.xls (last updated June 13, 2013). 
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against Serbia (1999), Afghanistan (2001–), Iraq (2003–), and Libya 
(2011–) are apparent. 
Moreover, rather than resort to armed force in Syria in August 2013 
over the use of chemical weapons, diplomacy prevailed and an agreement 
backed by a UN Security Council resolution led quickly to progress in the 
demolition of Syria’s chemical weapons capacity.2 If Syrian chemical 
weapons are destroyed through the art of diplomacy, we may see a revival 
of interest in alternatives to military force even in Washington, D.C. In 
September 2013, President Obama spoke by telephone with Iran’s 
President Rouhani, giving further support to the view that diplomacy 
might be on an upswing.
3
 
If the United States is moving toward a less militaristic phase, it will be 
an important time for international law specialists. We need to be ready to 
fill the knowledge vacuum when asked how the United States can forgo 
military force and yet promote security, prosperity, human dignity, and the 
natural environment both in the United States and in the world. Too many 
Americans—on the left and the right—have believed for too long that 
military force is the most effective way to deal with a range of complex 
problems from human rights violations to terrorism to arms control. The 
focus of these remarks is on the last problem in the list: arms control.
4
 
International law clearly prohibits the use of military force for arms 
control, but that is not the end of the story. International law embraces 
alternatives to the use of force to control certain weapons and certain 
weapons systems. I will illustrate this contrast of lawful and unlawful 
means by looking at four weapons categories:  
 WMDs, or weapons of mass destruction, which are chemical, 
biological, and nuclear weapons; 
 Drones, or unmanned aerial launch vehicles; the United States 
also possesses unmanned land and sea launch vehicles; 
 Cyber weapons, which are computer programs designed to have 
destructive capacity; and the newest category,  
 
 
 2. See S.C. Res. 2118, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2118 (Sept. 27, 2013). 
 3. See Iran News Round Up, IRAN TRACKER (Apr. 10, 2013), http://www.irantracker.org/iran-
news-round-april-10-2013. 
 4. For a general introduction to the international law restricting resort to force, see Mary Ellen 
O’Connell, The Prohibition of the Use of Force, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CONFLICT AND 
SECURITY LAW: JUS AD BELLUM, JUS IN BELLO, JUS POST BELLUM 89 (Nigel White & Christian 
Henderson eds., 2013). 
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 Fully autonomous weapons systems, which are robotic weapons 
programed to select and attack targets without further human 
intervention following the initial programing of the robot.
5
 
All four categories pose challenges for the international community. 
Although chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons are clearly unlawful 
to use, a few states still possess them and, in the case of nuclear weapons, 
may even be seeking to obtain them.
6
 Respecting unmanned, cyber, and 
fully autonomous weapons, certain commentators in the international 
security field indicate they are unaware of relevant international legal rules 
or seem to believe international law should play no role in regulating their 
use.
7
 
International law does exist respecting all of these weapons categories. 
Moreover, looking to the lessons taught by twentieth century arms control 
efforts, we find that international law is uniquely effective and appropriate 
for regulating weapons. Here are just three constructive lessons from 
twentieth century arms control: 
1. Controlling weapons proliferation by trying to keep a monopoly 
on technology or by staying ahead in technological development has 
not worked. 
2. Attempting to control weapons development, proliferation, or use 
through unlawful means, such as the use of force, has proven 
ineffective and counter-productive. 
3. Using the lawful means available in international law has 
succeeded in controlling weapons and in achieving other desiderata 
of the international community. 
We will begin by looking first at nuclear weapons, then at the other 
weapons categories. 
NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
Most will know at least the outlines of the story of the secret 
Manhattan project to produce an atomic bomb during World War II. 
 
 
 5. See Rob Sparrow, Killer Robots, 24 J. APPLIED PHIL. 62 (2007). 
 6. This is the conclusion of some respecting Iran, despite Iran’s official position that it is 
developing a domestic nuclear power capacity, not nuclear weapons. 
 7. See, e.g., the comments of a former National Security Agency lawyer, Stewart Baker, Denial 
of Service, Lawyers are Crippling America’s Ability to Defend Against Cyberwar with Arcane Rules 
and Regulations, FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/09/30/ 
denial_of_service. 
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Thanks in large part to old-fashioned espionage, the Soviets quickly 
acquired the technology to create their own atomic weapons. As Robert 
O’Connell describes in his book Of Arms and Men:  
Initially, Americans dealt with the bomb from the perspective of 
their own enormous postwar national power and the presumption of 
a nuclear monopoly of some considerable duration . . . . [Then] on 3 
September 1949 a B-29 flying over the South Pacific detected 
higher than normal radiation levels explicable only in terms of a 
Russian atomic bomb test. After only four short years, the nuclear 
monopoly had ended.
8
 
Since 1949, both lawful and unlawful measures have been taken to try to 
prevent more states from acquiring nuclear weapons. Starting with several 
examples of unlawful measures, we will quickly see that such measures 
have been inadequate and even counter-productive. In 1981, Israeli jets 
bombed a nuclear reactor under construction at Osirik, Iraq. The Security 
Council unanimously condemned the bombing as a violation of United 
Nations Charter Article 2(4) that was not excused as an exercise of self-
defense under Article 51 of the Charter.
9
 In the Security Council debate, 
most delegations pointed to the absence of an armed attack by Iraq on 
Israel as the most important missing element for lawful self-defense. 
States made it clear that they do not equate a future risk of nuclear attack 
with the armed attack requirement of Article 51. 
The American representative to the UN Security Council, Ambassador 
Jeanne Kirkpatrick, stated that the United States, too, understood Israel 
had violated the Charter, in particular because Israeli leaders had not 
exhausted peaceful alternatives before ordering the attack. Many 
representatives were impressed by the testimony of the Director General of 
the International Atomic Energy Agency that the IAEA had found no 
evidence of unlawful weapons development by the Iraqi government, such 
as diversion of nuclear material. Following Israel’s attack, Iraq did pursue 
nuclear weapons, but did so secretly in protected sites.
10
 Following the 
1991 Gulf War, the United Nations undertook concerted steps to ensure 
the elimination of all WMDs in Iraq. Those efforts succeeded well before 
the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia invaded in 2003. In 
 
 
 8. ROBERT L. O’CONNELL, OF ARMS AND MEN, A HISTORY OF WAR, WEAPONS, AND 
AGGRESSION 303 (1989). 
 9. See S.C. Res. 487, U.N. Doc. S/RES/487 (June 19, 1981), and accompanying debate. 
 10. Country Profiles: Iraq, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE, http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/ 
iraq (last visited Jan. 23, 2014). 
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letters to the Security Council, the three invading states sought to justify 
their resort to force as enforcement of Security Council resolutions 
mandating that Iraq eliminate its WMD programs.
11
 
Israel has also sought to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons 
through a variety of means, including assassinations of scientists.
12
 The 
United States has denied any involvement in violent action within Iran; 
Israel refuses to comment.
13
 Nevertheless, the United States has said that 
military force against Iran is “on the table.”14 Whether Iran’s nuclear 
ambitions have been slowed by either tactic is difficult to say. Some 
Iranian hardliners have likely cited the threats of military force to support 
the acquisition of nuclear weapons and to do so as soon as possible. Most 
observers credit tough economic sanctions as providing the pressure 
necessary to bring about the new round of negotiations with Iran that 
began in 2013.
15
 
Another unlawful measure taken against Iran has been the Stuxnet 
worm, apparently released by one or more governments, most likely the 
United States and Israel, in 2009–10 to slow the progress of Iran’s nuclear 
program.
16
 Stuxnet attacked computers manufactured by Siemens and used 
in the Iranian nuclear program. The effect of the worm in Iran was to 
cause centrifuges to turn far more rapidly than appropriate. In early 2011, 
officials in Israel and the United States announced that Iran’s nuclear 
program had been set back “by several years.” The Stuxnet worm, 
however, affected computers in other countries as well, including India, 
Indonesia, and Russia. Indeed, it is believed that forty percent of the 
computers affected were outside Iran. Stuxnet is said to be “the first-
 
 
 11. Letter of John Negroponte, former United States Ambassador to the United Nations, to the 
President of the Security Council (Mar. 20, 2003) (on file with author). 
 12. Saeed Kamali Dehghan, Iran Nuclear Scientist Killed in Tehran Motorbike Bomb Attack, 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 11, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jan/11/iran-nuclear-scientist-
killed.  
 13. See Thomas Erdbrink & Joby Warbrick, Iranian Scientist Involved in Nuclear Program 
Killed in Tehran Bomb Attack, WASH. POST (Jan. 11, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ 
iranian-scientist-killed-in-tehran-bomb-attack/2012/01/11/gIQAT1V7pP_story.html. 
 14. Mark Landler, Obama Says Iran Strike Is an Option, but Warns Israel, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/03/world/middleeast/obama-says-military-option-on-iran-
not-a-bluff.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 15. This is the position taken by President Obama. See Deal Reached on Implementing Iranian 
Nuclear Agreement, AL JAZEERA AMERICA (Jan. 12, 2013), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/ 
1/12/report-iran-saysallsidesagreetonucleardeal.html. 
 16. James Hilder, Computer Virus Used to Sabotage Iran’s Nuclear Plan “Built by US and 
Israel”, AUSTRALIAN (Jan. 27, 2011), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/. 
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known worm designed to target real-world infrastructure such as power 
stations, water plants and industrial units.”17 
Ralph Langner, a German computer security expert, is convinced 
Stuxnet is a government-produced worm: “This is not some hacker sitting 
in the basement of his parents’ house. To me, it seems that the resources 
needed to stage this attack point to a nation state.”18 In another interview, 
Langer added: “Code analysis makes it clear that Stuxnet is not about 
sending a message or providing a concept. It is about destroying its targets 
with utmost determination in military style . . . .”19 The worm may have 
slowed Iranian progress for some months, but it is now in the hands of 
criminal hackers and governments everywhere. 
In short, the use of military force, assassinations, threats of force, and 
cyber attacks have all proven ineffective to end nuclear programs. By 
contrast to these various unlawful means, lawful means available within 
international law have proven successful without serious negative and 
unintended consequences. Thanks to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (NPT),
20
 the vast majority of states in the world do not 
possess nuclear weapons and do not seek them. This is an extraordinary 
accomplishment. Of the 193 sovereign states in the world that are 
members of the United Nations, only nine have nuclear weapons and only 
one state, Iran, is allegedly seeking them. 
Through the NPT, an international legal instrument, the world has built 
an important norm against the possession or use of nuclear weapons. 
Moreover, the weight of evidence indicates that with a greater effort by the 
United States, the newer nuclear powers—India, Israel, North Korea, and 
Pakistan—might not have acquired nuclear weapons or might have been 
persuaded to give them up by now. Libya and Brazil were both persuaded 
to give up nuclear weapons programs. South Africa and Ukraine were 
persuaded to actually give up the weapons they possessed. Iraq gave up its 
nuclear ambitions following its defeat in the Gulf War of 1991. UN 
weapons inspectors succeeded in exposing Iraq’s program, and it was 
dismantled. Then thanks to the sanctions imposed on Iraq, which were 
enforced by NATO and largely by the United States, Iraq was never able 
to acquire inputs to any of its WMD programs. The human rights 
advocacy community heavily criticized the sanctions regime and even 
 
 
 17. Johnathan Fildes, Stuxnet Work “Targeted High-Value Iranian Assets”, BBC (Sept. 23, 
2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-11388018. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Hilder, supra note 16. 
 20. July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161. 
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those who defended it.
21
 Yet the defenders could tell the sanctions were 
working to prevent Saddam Hussein from building WMDs. The UN’s Oil 
for Food program assured Iraq’s ability to purchase food and medicine for 
the population. It was Saddam’s decision to warehouse the purchases to 
create a media impression of the devastating impact of sanctions. In fact, 
Saddam Hussein had no WMDs by 2003, but did have warehouses full of 
food and medicine. 
At the urging of the Soviet Union, North Korea joined the NPT in 
December 1985. In 1994, the U.S. was able to persuade North Korea to 
suspend building its own nuclear power capacity in exchange for two light 
water reactors.
22
 The Clinton administration never delivered the reactors. 
North Korea subsequently withdrew from the NPT in 2003 and began 
developing a nuclear weapons capacity.
23
 The Bush administration made a 
new pledge to supply the reactors in 2005. It, too, failed to fulfill the U.S. 
promise. By 2006, North Korea had a nuclear weapon.
24
 No one can say 
with certainty whether North Korea would have lived up to its end of the 
bargain, but under international law, North Korea’s performance of its 
promise was premised on the prior U.S. performance. 
Iran, the IAEA, which monitors the NPT, the United States, UK, 
Germany, France, China, and Russia are at the time of this writing 
involved in intense negotiations to end the conflict over Iran’s nuclear 
program. Iran’s President, Hassan Rouhani, invited new negotiations on 
Iran’s nuclear problem soon after the U.S. turn to diplomacy respecting 
Syrian chemical weapons, a turn that included a move away from a 
military attack.
25
 Successful negotiations will require following the classic 
steps of Getting to Yes.
26
 Both sides will need to consider what the other 
needs in order to agree to concessions.  
 
 
 21. One of the most critical assessments of sanctions on Iraq used a title that entered the 
vernacular: “Sanctions of Mass Destruction.” John Mueller & Karl Mueller, Sanctions of Mass 
Destruction, 78 FOREIGN AFF. 43 (1999). 
 22. The U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework at a Glance, ARMS CONTROL ASSOC. (Aug. 
2004), http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/agreedframework. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Erik Mobrand, The Road to North Korea’s Nuclear Test, WORLD SECURITY NETWORK (Oct. 
8, 2006), http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/Koreas/erik-mobrand/The-Road-to-North-Korea%E2 
%80%99s-Nuclear-Test. 
 25. See Symposium, The U.S.-Iranian Relationship and the Future of International Order, 2 
PENN. ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 237 (2013), available at http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/jlia/vol2/iss2/12/. 
 26. ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT 
GIVING IN (1983).  
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UNMANNED WEAPONS 
Arguably, the first major revolution in military weapons development 
since the advent of nuclear weapons is owed to the computer. Computers 
have revolutionized war fighting in many ways, but computer-controlled 
unmanned launch vehicles are the weapons part of the revolution. The 
United States developed a drone at the end of World War II or soon after. 
Drones were used for reconnaissance in Vietnam, the Gulf War, the 
Balkans conflicts, and in all wars since. The first use of a drone in a lethal 
operation occurred in November, 2001 in the Afghanistan War. The 
legality of that use is hard to dispute, given that the United States was 
engaged in armed conflict with the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan at 
the time and was firing missiles and dropping bombs from manned 
aircraft. 
In November, 2002, however, the CIA carried out the first killings 
using a drone far from the battlefields of Afghanistan. The attack occurred 
in Yemen where, at the time, no armed conflict was underway and no 
attack on the United States had occurred that could give rise to a U.S. right 
to undertake military action in Yemen. In 2004, the CIA began a campaign 
of targeted killing in Pakistan and, in late 2006, similar attacks began in 
Somalia. New drone bases are being established around the world, raising 
the expectation of future drone attacks. According to The Bureau of 
Investigative Journalism, by the end of 2013, the United States had killed 
as many as 4100 people beyond armed conflict zones with drones, 
including over 200 children.
27
 
The Obama Administration has tried to characterize these U.S. drone 
attacks as lawful by invoking as many as six distinct but contradictory 
justifications.
28
 In an approach reminiscent of the legal argument made to 
justify the Cuban quarantine during the Cuban Missile Crisis and the use 
of force in the Kosovo intervention, the Administration’s lawyers seem to 
pile on many arguments that might almost work in the hope that the public 
and allies might see the accumulated arguments as sufficient. These 
lawyers likely know that the arguments are not sufficient in international 
law but hope they will create a case of special circumstances that allows 
 
 
 27. Monthly Updates on the Covert War, BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM, http://www. 
thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/monthly-updates/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2014). 
 28. Mary Ellen O’Connell, Drone Attacks & International Law, Address at the Indianapolis 
Peace and Justice Center (Nov. 26, 2013), available at http://indianapolis.granicus.com/MediaPlayer. 
php?view_id=51&clip_id=10804.  
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the United States, and perhaps a few close allies such as the UK and Israel, 
to use drones beyond armed conflict zones. 
The U.S. position is, of course, untenable as a matter of law. Other 
countries are showing an interest in using drones in the same way the 
United States does, in particular, China. The New York Times carried a 
front-page article on the day these remarks were delivered, reading: 
“Hacking U.S. Secrets, China Pushes for Drones.”29 China has apparently 
targeted companies that have developed U.S. drone technology with 
considerable success: “Chinese officials this month sent a drone near 
disputed islands administered by Japan; debated using a weaponized drone 
last year to kill a criminal suspect in Myanmar; and sold homemade 
drones resembling the Predator, the American model, to other countries 
for less than a million dollars each.”30 
The United States has set the precedent of using military force in 
situations in which, prior to 9/11, the United States would have used law 
enforcement methods. As a result, the legal and ethical barriers to resort to 
significant violence are being eroded. The United States is in the best 
position to slow this development by admitting its legal error and 
complying with its obligations. Only then will it be in position to protest 
China’s conduct or the conduct of other states. 
CYBER WEAPONS 
We have already discussed the Stuxnet worm as the first use of a 
computer program by one government to do significant physical damage 
to another. In January, 2010, investigators with the IAEA noticed 
something was wrong with the centrifuges at an Iranian nuclear facility. 
The Iranian scientists had been replacing the centrifuges at many times the 
normal rate.
31
 They discovered that, in 2009, someone had unleashed a 
program that had infiltrated computers across the world using the most 
complex malware ever written.
32
  
 
 
 29. Edward Wong, Hacking U.S. Secrets, China Pushes for Drones, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2013, 
at A1. 
 30. Edward Wong, Hacking U.S. Secrets, China Pushes for Drones, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/21/world/asia/hacking-us-secrets-china-pushes-for-drones. 
html?_r=0. 
 31. See Kim Zetter, How Digital Detectives Deciphered Stuxnet, the Most Menacing Malware in 
History, WIRED (July 11, 2011), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/07/how-digital-detectives-
deciphered-stuxnet/. 
 32. Id. 
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In response to the attack, Iran began recruiting its own team of elite 
hackers.
33
 The goal was to prevent another attack and to gain the capacity 
to retaliate with a virus of its own. Something like a world arms race for 
cyber weapons may now be underway. The ability to keep the code for 
cyber weapons secret may prove even more difficult than keeping the 
secrets of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.
34
 An adaptation of 
Stuxnet known as DuQu has already been created.
35
 CrSyS, a lab of the 
Budapest University of Technology, discovered the program and wrote a 
sixty-page report on it.
36
 CrSyS found it is “nearly identical to Stuxnet” 
but built for a different purpose.
37
 DuQu was made to gather information,
38
 
specifically, to steal the blueprints of Iran’s nuclear program and then 
remove itself from Iran’s computers.39 DuQu has also provided additional 
insight into the origins of Stuxnet. For example, researchers found that the 
Stuxnet’s working hours coincided with Jerusalem local time.40 
The invention of DuQu as a consequence of Stuxnet has not, 
apparently, deterred the United States. In 2012, another virus was detected, 
known as “Flame,” which appears to be a part of the same campaign as 
Stuxnet.
41
 A researcher at Kaspersky Labs, who brought Flame’s existence 
to public light, said, “We believe Flame was written by a different team of 
programmers but commissioned by the same larger entity.”42 Like DuQu, 
Flame is an espionage tool. It spreads through BlueTooth.
43
 Also, like 
DuQu, Flame names many of its processes after American media 
characters, including BeetleJuice and Jason Bourne.
44
 Virkram Thakur, a 
Symantec researcher, said, “This is the third such virus we’ve seen in the 
 
 
 33. Shaun Waterman, Iran Readying Hacker Attacks on U.S. Infrastructure, Specialists Say, 
WASH. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2012), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/apr/25/iran-readying-
hacker-attacks-us-infrastructure-spe/. 
 34. Adam Levin, Hackers: If You Can’t Beat ‘Em, Hire ‘Em, ABC NEWS (June 16, 2012), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/hackers-beat-em-hire-em/story?id=16578552. 
 35. Kim Zetter, DuQu Mystery Language Solved With the Help of Crowdsourcing, WIRED (Mar. 
19, 2012), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/03/duqu-mystery-language-solved/. 
 36. SYMANTEC SECURITY RESPONSE, W32.DUQU: THE PRECURSOR TO THE NEXT STUXNET 
(2011), available at http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/ 
whitepapers/w32_duqu_the_precursor_to_the_next_stuxnet.pdf. 
 37. Id. at 1. 
 38. Steven Cherry, Hackers are Learning New Lessons from the Most Sophisticated Virus Code 
Ever Written, IEEE SPECTRUM (Dec. 14, 2011), http://spectrum.ieee.org/podcast/telecom/security/ 
sons-of-stuxnet.  
 39.  Nicole Perlroth, Researchers Find Clues in Malware, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/31/technology/researchers-link-flame-virus-to-stuxnet-and-duqu. html. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id.  
 42. Id.  
 43. Id.  
 44. Id.  
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past three years. It’s larger than all of them. The question we should be 
asking now is: How many more such campaigns are going on that we 
don’t know about?”45  
Cyber weapons are very difficult to keep secret. Once they are 
decoded, they can be turned into new weapons. The Stuxnet virus was 
intended to target facilities with a specific layout.
46
 However, it was spread 
using USB flash drives
47
 and other means which have reached across the 
globe.
48
  
“[Stuxnet] spun out of control. Although it was intended to stop the 
progress of Iran’s nuclear program, it also damaged 100,000 
computers all over Europe. There was a need to stop it. Cyberwars 
act like boomerangs . . . . So it would be advisable for governments 
not to enter cyber-wars because in a boomerang war there are no 
winners.”49 
Even if the United States and Israel used Stuxnet, it did not rise to the 
level of an armed attack that could trigger Iran’s right to respond in self-
defense by using force on the territory of the United States or Israel. 
Stuxnet did not meet the Nicaragua case test of a forceful or coercive 
action significant enough to be an armed attack.
50
 Instead, it was a 
violation of the non-intervention principle. 
International law raises substantial barriers to both using cyber 
weapons and defending cyberspace from cyber attacks through the use of 
military force. In general, international law supports regulating cyberspace 
as an economic and communications sphere and contains coercive means 
of responding lawfully to cyber provocations of all types. The same sort of 
coercive measures that are lawful to use against economic wrongs and 
violations of arms control treaties will generally be lawful to use in the 
case of a cyber attack. In the economic sphere, coercive responses to 
 
 
 45. Id.  
 46. Paul Mueller & Babak Yadegari, The Stuxnet Worm (University of Arizona Student Research 
Presentation), http://www.cs.arizona.edu/~collberg/Teaching/466-566/2012/Resources/presentations/ 
2012/topic9-final/report.pdf. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Stuxnet Goes Out of Control: Chevron Infected by Anti-Iranian Virus, Others Could Be Next, 
RT (Nov. 9, 2012), http://rt.com/usa/stuxnet-chevron-cyber-virus-348/. 
 49. Ilan Gattegno, Exclusive: Stuxnet Was Out of Control, We Had to Reveal It, ISRAEL HAYOM 
(June 14, 2013), http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_article.php?id=9983.  
 50. The International Court of Justice has ruled on this very point in a number of important cases. 
See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 98–
106 (June 27); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 
I.C.J. 168, 222–3, 268 (Dec. 19). 
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violations tend to be known as “countermeasures”; in arms control, such 
countermeasures are commonly known as “sanctions.” 
Whether designated countermeasures or sanctions, there are coercive 
enforcement measures not involving the use of significant military force 
available to states acting unilaterally in response to an internationally 
wrongful act.
51
 Despite the availability of these alternatives to the use of 
military force, it is important to reiterate that protecting cyberspace—
keeping it viable for economic and communication uses—will generally 
require defensive measures, not offensive ones. Countermeasures are no 
substitute for good computer security. 
When a state is the victim of a cyberattack or cyber espionage, and it 
has clear and convincing evidence that the wrong is attributable to a 
foreign sovereign state, the victim state may itself commit a wrong against 
the attacking state, so long as the wrong is commensurate with the initial 
wrong (proportionality) and aimed at inducing an end to the initial wrong 
(necessity) or the provision of damages. In most cases of cyber wrongs, 
the evidence that a foreign state is behind a particular act will come after 
the act is over or the damage is done. This fact indicates that most 
countermeasures aimed at cyber wrongs will aim at collecting money 
damages. 
FULLY AUTONOMOUS ROBOTIC WEAPONS 
The advent of robots with computer programs that can learn is 
triggering a new and intense discussion of the law and ethics around such 
weapons.
52
 Advances in artificial intelligence mean that once a robot is 
constructed and programmed, it will be able to make the decision to attack 
without additional human intervention.
53
 Such an attack could occur years 
after the robot is programed. The parties to the Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons
54
 began a process in 2013 to study fully 
 
 
 51. Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 ICJ REP. 7, 52–57 (Sept. 25). 
 52. U.S. Dep’t of Defense Directive 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems 2 (Nov. 21, 2012), 
available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300009p.pdf (“Autonomous and semi-
autonomous weapon systems shall be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise 
appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force.”); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOSING 
HUMANITY: THE CASE AGAINST KILLER ROBOTS (Nov. 2012), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/ 
default/files/reports/arms1112_ForUpload.pdf.  
 53. Peter W. Singer, In the Loop? Armed Robots and the Future of War, BROOKINGS INST. (Jan. 
28, 2009), http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2009/0128_robots_singer.aspx.  
 54. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons 
Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 
1342 U.N.T.S. 137. 
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autonomous robotic weapons as the first step toward a new protocol 
controlling or prohibiting such weapons.
55
 In April, 2013, UN Special 
Rapporteur Christof Heyns called for a moratorium on moving beyond the 
design stage in the development of fully autonomous weapons pending the 
formation of a panel of experts to “articulate a policy for the international 
community on the issue.”56 
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 
Biological weapons have existed as long as warfare has. The modern 
word “toxin” derives from the Ancient Greek word for a poisoned arrow.57 
Early biological weapons “included the contamination of water with 
animal carcasses and filth.”58 Some ancient military leaders used 
biological projectile weapons. For example, in a naval battle, Hannibal 
launched poisonous snakes onto enemy ships.
59
 This tactic continued into 
the dark ages where armies flung plague victims into besieged cities.
60
 
European settlers in North America used smallpox as a biological weapon 
against the Native Americans. In the battle for Fort Pitt, one local militia 
leader wrote, “We gave them two Blankets and a Handkerchief from the 
Smallpox Hospital. I hope it will have the desired effect.”61 Similar tactics 
were used in the Ohio River Valley.
62
 
With the advent of scientific bacteriology in the nineteenth century, the 
world became more worried about the possibility of mass biological 
warfare. The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 banned the use of 
“poison or poisoned arms.”63 However, this measure did little to deter their 
 
 
 55. CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER ROBOTS, THE CONVENTION ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND 
FULLY AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS: BACKGROUND PAPER BY THE CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER ROBOTS 
(Sept. 26, 2013), available at http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/KRC_ 
BackgrounderCCW_26Sep2013.pdf.  
 56. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/47 (Apr. 9, 
2013) (by Cristof Heyns). 
 57. James W. Martin et al., History of Biological Weapons: From Poisoned Darts to Intentional 
Epidemics, in MEDICAL ASPECTS OF BIOLOGICAL WARFARE 1, 2 (Zygmunt F. Dembek ed., 2007), 
available at https://ke.army.mil/bordeninstitute/published_volumes/biological_warfare/BW-ch01.pdf. 
 58. Id. 
 59. BRIG. GEN. J. H. ROTHSCHILD, TOMORROW’S WEAPONS: CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL 12 
(1964). 
 60. Martin et al., supra note 57, at 2. 
 61. E. WAGNER STEARN & ALLEN E. STEARN, THE EFFECT OF SMALLPOX ON THE DESTINY OF 
THE AMERINDIAN 45 (1945). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: 
Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. 
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use during the First World War. While both sides participated in biological 
warfare, the Germans led the effort. They started the first known state-
sponsored biological research program,
64
 and preemptively sent animals 
infected with anthrax to the United States and other countries.
65
 Germany 
also attempted to destroy crops in Argentina using a fungus.
66
 
As a result of the failure of the 1907 Hague Convention to stop the use 
of these weapons (although perhaps it was more motivated by the use of 
chemical weapons to kill over 90,000 individuals in World War I), the 
1925 Geneva Protocol banned the “use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous 
or other gasses, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices.”67 The 
treaty was credited with the prevention of the use of these weapons during 
World War II, but nevertheless had serious gaps in its coverage.
68
 The 
parties reserved the right to use the weapons against non-parties; to use the 
weapons in retaliation; to stockpile, design, and test the weapons; and to 
limit the prohibition to wartime use.
69
 
Therefore, in the 1930s, Japan created a biological weapon program 
(eventually referred to using the unit references of the groups carrying out 
the research, Unit 731 and Unit 100). Japan’s program was on a far larger 
scale than Germany’s pre-World War I effort. More than 3000 Chinese 
prisoners were killed during testing.
70
 Eleven Chinese cities were attacked 
during “field trials.” While these trials backfired on the Japanese (a 
number of their own citizens died in the process), an estimated 580,000 
Chinese were killed.
71
 However, without an effective delivery system, the 
weapons were never deployed in war. The British also developed 
antipersonnel and anti-cattle biological weapons but never deployed 
them.
72
 
 
 
539. “In addition to the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is especially forbidden: (a) To 
employ poison or poisoned weapons.” Id. Regulations art. 23. 
 64. Martin et al., supra note 57, at 3. 
 65. Michael Jacobs, The History of Biologic Warfare and Bioterrorism, 22 DERMATOLOGIC 
CLINICS 231 (2004). 
 66. Martin et al., supra note 57, at 3. 
 67. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, 
and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65. 
 68.  Michael P. Scharf, Clear and Present Danger: Enforcing the International Ban on 
Biological and Chemical Weapons Through Sanctions, Use of Force, and Criminalization, 20 MICH. J. 
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The United States took a defensive approach to biological warfare, 
focusing efforts on preventing an attack through President Roosevelt’s 
War Reserve Service.
73
 The United States did, however, give Japanese 
scientists amnesty in exchange for the data resulting from their atrocities. 
After the start of the Korean War, the United States developed its own 
anti-crop and antipersonnel weapons but never deployed them. Still, North 
Korean, Chinese, and Soviet officials have made numerous allegations 
against the United States.
74
 However, these allegations were 
unsubstantiated, and the accusing countries refused offers by the ICRC 
and WHO to conduct investigations and thwarted a UN proposal to 
establish a neutral investigative body.
75
 
In 1972, as a result of the weak 1925 Geneva Protocol, the Biological 
Weapons Convention was adopted.
76
 Under article I, parties agreed to 
never produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire: 
Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin 
or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no 
justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; 
[and] [w]eapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use 
such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.
77
 
Also, article II required the destruction of all such weapons.
78
 It remains to 
improve the enforcement provisions of the treaty. Major efforts in this 
direction were made in the 1990s, and an on-site investigation capacity 
was proposed in  
a protocol that envisioned states submitting to an international body 
declarations of treaty-relevant facilities and activities. That body 
would conduct routine on-site visits to declared facilities and could 
conduct challenge inspections of suspect facilities and activities as 
well. 
 
 
 73. Id. at 5. 
 74. Id. at 6. 
 75. Id. at 7. 
 76. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 
583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163. 
 77. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction art. I, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 
U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163. 
 78. Id. art. II. See Susan Wright, Prospects for Biological Disarmament in the 1990s, 2 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. L. 453, 454 (1992). 
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 However, a number of fundamental issues—such as the scope of on-
site visits and the role export controls would play in the regime—proved 
difficult to resolve. In March 2001, the Ad Hoc Group’s chairman issued a 
draft protocol containing language attempting to strike a compromise on 
disputed issues. But in July 2001, at the Ad Hoc Group’s last scheduled 
meeting, the United States rejected the draft and any further protocol 
negotiations, claiming such a protocol could not help strengthen 
compliance with the BWC and could hurt U.S. national security and 
commercial interests.
79
 
CHEMICAL WEAPONS 
The use of modern chemical weapons began in World War I. Robert 
O’Connell describes the moment:  
Late in the afternoon on 22 April 1915 members of the French 
Forty-fifth (Algerian) and Eighty-seventh (Territorial) divisions 
were amazed to see a vast, greenish yellow cloud spring out of the 
ground and begin rolling toward their positions along the Ypres 
salient. Within moments the cloud had enveloped them, and they 
found themselves choking and fighting for breath. Those who were 
not immediately overcome ran in panic . . . .
80
 
The Allies had used some irritants earlier in the fighting, but the invention 
of a way to release bottled chlorine on the battlefield was a German 
scientific breakthrough. “[W]ithin a year the Allies would field workable 
chemical munitions of their own.”81 Both sides also quickly developed 
techniques and equipment for protecting their troops. To the extent the 
Germans tried to keep their chemical weapons technology secret or to stay 
ahead of the Allies, they failed. The Germans gained little or no advantage 
from their lead in developing chemical weapons. Already in 1925, the 
Geneva Gas Protocol came into force banning use of chemical weapons. 
The ban emerged from moral outrage, but took the form of a rule of 
international law. Then in 1993, the world adopted a comprehensive treaty 
declaring unlawful the use, production, and stockpiling of chemical 
weapons. 
 
 
 79. The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) at a Glance, ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION, 
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/bwc (last visited Jan. 26, 2014). 
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In addition to secrecy, we have examples of states attempting to use 
military force to stop the development of chemical weapons. In 2007, 
Israel bombed Syria aiming to end an alleged weapons program.
82
 Israel 
sent eight fighter jets to destroy an alleged secret weapons production 
facility Syria was building with assistance from North Korea. Reports 
stated that it was a nuclear weapons facility, but the facts indicate it was 
more likely a chemical weapons facility, specifically to manufacture nerve 
agents. Several days passed before Syria protested against the attack. It 
held back apparently to try to avoid drawing attention to its illicit 
activities.
83
 Plainly this attack had little or no impact on Syrian chemical 
stockpiles, as chemical weapons have been used in the Syrian civil war 
that began in 2011.
84
 The open question is whether Israel’s attack explains 
why Syria did not join the Chemical Weapons Convention
85
 in recent 
years despite indications from the UN Secretary-General that it was close 
to doing so. 
In addition to Israel’s actual use of unlawful force against Syria, the 
United States threatened to use force against Syria in August, 2013 
following a use of chemical weapons during the civil war. The United 
States did not cite any basis in international law to justify such a use of 
force. Rather, references were made to the use of force in the Kosovo 
crisis in 1999. U.S. Ambassador to the UN Samantha Power, was asked on 
National Public Radio on September 9 whether a U.S. attack on Syria 
would be “legal.” She answered that it would be a “legitimate, necessary, 
and proportionate response.”86 
Ambassador Power’s answer recalls a report Sweden commissioned 
following NATO’s use of force against Serbia during the Kosovo crisis of 
1999. The report’s authors concluded that the seventy-eight days of 
bombing was unlawful under international law but, nevertheless, 
 
 
 82. See Ben Piven, Timeline: Israeli Attacks on Syrian Targets, ALJAZEERA (May 5, 2013), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/05/20135512739431489.html. 
 83. See Mary Ellen O’Connell, Affirming the Ban on Bombing Iran, SYRACUSE L. REV. (2012), 
http://www.law.syr.edu/student-life/publications/law-review/iran-nuclear-symposium/mary-ellen-
oconnell.aspx. 
 84. See U.N. Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of the Chemical Weapons in the 
Syrian Arab Republic, Rep. on the Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta Area of 
Damascus, U.N. Doc. A/67/997 (Aug. 21, 2013) .  
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“legitimate.”87 In 2003, following the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, the UN 
Secretary-General ordered a thorough review of the UN Charter rules on 
the use of force. The preliminary report of his High Level Panel concluded 
that, contrary to statements of some in the international law community 
that the use of force in Kosovo was “illegal but legitimate,” the measure of 
legitimacy in the international community is legality. It must be—law is 
the common code of all humanity. It is not the moral discernment of any 
particular national leaders. 
Attacking Syria without Security Council authorization would violate 
law even more fundamental than the chemical weapons ban. Ambassador 
Power argued that because the Security Council will not authorize force, 
force must be used, lawful or not. She implies that force is the only way to 
keep important norms viable. Using force unlawfully, however, will only 
undermine the very system that also prohibits the use of chemical 
weapons.  
It is important that a response be made to chemical weapons use, but 
the response needs to be a lawful response. As already discussed, 
international law has a variety of means, including countermeasures. 
Individual national leaders can be held accountable today for the use of 
chemical weapons. The International Criminal Court might have 
jurisdiction. Where it does not, the Security Council has established a 
variety of ad hoc criminal courts. 
The Obama administration was aware that Syria was stockpiling 
chemical weapons and did not stop it. Interdicting such weapons would 
have been a lawful countermeasure in this case. An embargo kept Saddam 
Hussein form getting the inputs necessary to develop chemical, biological, 
and nuclear weapons programs. Having missed the opportunity to impose 
a similar embargo on Syria, the United States took the lead in the effort to 
destroy Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile and production facilities. The 
U.S. action is exemplary and should support the understanding that the use 
of chemical weapons is absolutely prohibited in international law. A use of 
force, on the other hand, would have violated a higher norm against 
military force to enforce another important norm. Such conduct would 
have been illogical and destructive of the normative system as a whole that 
has created the international consensus against chemical weapons use. 
Political observers say the real focus of the threat of force against Syria 
was not Syria and chemical weapons, but Iran and nuclear weapons. That 
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may be, but just as with Syria, for the United States to get Iran to comply 
with international legal obligations by threatening or actually violating 
international law undermines the U.S. case. The United States has been 
saying to Iran for many years that Iran is legally prohibited from 
possessing nuclear weapons under the NPT and that the UN Security 
Council has mandated UN weapons inspectors to have access to alleged 
nuclear sites. The U.S. ability to apply moral and legal suasion has been 
undermined in recent years owing to everything from the Guantanamo 
Bay prison, to the invasion of Iraq, to the use of drones. Bombing Syria 
over the use of chemical weapons would have been another significant 
violation of international law, likely with similar consequences. 
CONCLUSION 
In the last third of 2013, the art of diplomacy had a resurgence in the 
area of arms control. Thanks to a deftly negotiated agreement, Syria 
became committed to destroying its chemical weapons and joining the 
Chemical Weapons Convention. Soon after, Iran agreed to allow IAEA 
inspectors into its facilities and new negotiations were underway with the 
United States and others toward curtailing its nuclear program. 
Diplomacy, in contrast to secrecy or military force, has a proven record of 
success respecting arms control. In arms control, as in so much else, the 
past is prologue. 
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